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ecovery from a large disaster event is a complex process. It
is a process of life recovery, where part of the past no longer
exists and what is the future depends on many decisions that
involve people we sometimes do not know. City planners cer
tainly can be of help in the recovery process as usually there
are many land use, city design, sustainability, community de
velopment, safety and transportation issues involved. While
people would like to live in the same place as they did before a
disaster, many times this is not possible; so in part, recovery is
about inventing the future.
Since 2008, large scale disasters have occurred all over the
world including the United States (floods and wildfires), Italy
(earthquake), Brazil (landslides), Australia (floods and wildfires),
China (earthquake and land slides), Chile (earthquake and tsu
nami), New Zealand (earthquakes and earth deformation), and
Japan (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear). Thousands of people

Estimate damage ($US billion)

Figure 1: Damage caused by reported natural disasters 1975
2010. (source: Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED). 2012. International Disaster Data Base, Catholic Univer
sity of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. (http://www.emdat.be/)

have lost their lives in some of these events and the overall
losses and cost of reconstruction is close to $500 billion dollars.
Increasing damage costs are the trend over the past three de
cades (Figure 1).
In all large disasters the central (national) government is called
upon to provide support in terms of financial and technical
assistance, as well to provide a leadership role in designing
the strategy for recovery. In less developed countries, central
government struggles to provide leadership and resources.
In developed countries, the central government plays a major
role with direct management of the recovery process or, as in
the United States, it supplies funding and technical support.
In this way recovery becomes a partnership, however unequal
between the survivors (people and businesses) and govern
ment. The way the partnerships are formed and carried out de
termines the path to recovery. These partnerships evolve and
adapt to changing conditions in real time.
This article discusses three countries (Japan, Chile, New Zea
land) where I visited the disaster areas, spoke to the local
people and worked with NGOs and government agencies to
understand the recovery process and assist in it. What they
have in common is that they have suffered their largest disas
ter event in modern history between the years 2010-2011, all
at the hands of an earthquake. These events also are multi
locational, spanning more than a single city, district, or state.
They occurred along coastal areas, inland, and in some cases
impacted cities for hundreds of kilometers. The vast spatial
mix in locations, in topography, in geology, and in impact to
historic sites creates complex planning challenges. All of these
countries are advanced societies in terms of economic status,
functioning democratic practices, and stable governments.
They suffer not from threats of war and social conflict, but from
multi-natural hazard threats. Can their recovering process
make these areas more resilient against future threats and pos
sibly more sustainable? Can design approaches help, and how
do planners begin to understand the needs of the local people
and help them?
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The time frame used in this paper is two years or less from the
initial event(s). This is not enough time for an assessment of
comprehensive recovery, but enough time to establish the re
covery strategy and the types of partnerships between the sur
vivors and their governments. While each country adapts and
recovers in its own way, central government involvement is a
constant, although expressed in different ways. While there is a
common saying that “all disaster is local,” there is also a reality
that “all local disaster survivors want the central government to
help them with the damage to their lives and property.”
While each country has its own story based on its own histori
cal context, all have things in common. They are prone to seis
mic, volcanic, and tsunami events. For example, Japan experi
ences 20% of all 6.0 magnitude and above earthquakes while
living on just one percent of the earth’s surface. Each country
has a long coastline that is subject to tsunami events. There
are also clear differences with Japan having a history of at least
two thousand years, while Chile (established in 1818) and New
Zealand (established in 1840) are younger countries with Euro
pean roots. Chile was a former colony of Spain with immigrant
communities from Italy and Germany, and New Zealand has
Anglo-Saxon roots as former colony of England and Scotland.
They have differing governmental systems and democratic tra
ditions. All have legal planning systems for the regulation of
land use, buildings construction and public safety.

Growing Interest in Disaster Risk Reduction
The recognition that large scale disasters cause increasing
amounts of property damage and extensive disruption to the
local economy has led governments in industrialized countries
to seek to lower impacts using two major strategies. First are
structural measures that strengthen the built environment. Bet
ter building codes, higher levees, stronger bridges are examples
of such measures. The other strategy is non-structural measures.
Avoiding building in a high flood area or on top of an earth
quake fault, removing brush from around buildings, and estab
lishing evacuation routes, and buying insurance are examples of
non-structural actions. A third strategy also has emerged; it can
be called “behavioral.” This includes educating people to under
stand hazard risks and taking some actions to lower impacts.
All of these strategies fall under a broader umbrella called di
saster risk reduction. This paper uses a simple three-part frame
work: assessment, dialogue and action ( Wisner et al., 2011). The
framework: Assessment, Dialogue and Action (Figure 2) is not
linear, but interactive; and I use it in this way. In reality, the com
ponents and feedback provide information and iterate. In this
way they are a design process. Each, however, requires its own
time frame to complete, and can cause (as we see in the case
of New Zealand) considerable conflict as to how geo-seismic
knowledge is generated and then applied in the dialogue frame.

Assessment
What caused the disaster in each country and what was its im-

Figure 2. Integrated risk reduction framework.
(source: Wisner et al., 2012)

pact? Table 1 provides comparative information on the three
countries related to the disaster event. The administrative re
covery organization information is shown in Table 2. The Tim
ing of Major Actions is presented in Table 3. These three tables
create a disaster profile.
The recovery plan or strategy, issued by the central government,
or its recovery agency, envisions a decade of effort. Why ten
years is a common number is not clear. Generally most central
governments realize that certain restoration actions are required
before reconstruction can take place, and that the complexity of
recovery in administrative, social, technical and administrative
terms simply takes time, more than is usually estimated. Each
country faces different technical and engineering challenges.
This is an important finding. It establishes that we need to know
a great deal about local conditions (geotechnical, topographic,
historical) in order to make proper recovery decisions.
Japan, with its earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, faces
the most difficult challenge of the three. Based on progress in
year one, Iwate and Myagi prefectures can meet their ten-year
goal. In the Fukushima prefecture it will take at least two gen
erations to complete the tasks of decommissioning the nuclear
plants and decontamination of the surrounding areas.

Temporary housing
With the loss of so many houses due to the tsunami, 55,000
temporary units were built in Japan and installed within three
months of the disaster. These are factory built units, assembled
on site and fully serviced by power and water. Most of these
are scattered site clusters averaging 30-40 units, although
some large 100-150-unit groups do exist. In some prefectures,
private rentals have been used for temporary units. The central
government pays the costs of this temporary housing. While a
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Table 1: Comparison of Japan, Chile, New Zealand earthquakes and related events, damages and costs.
Housing	
  
Damaged Cities Total Estimated
Damaged
Major Disaster
and	
  Larger
Economic	
  Cost
(Destroyed-‐
Characteristics
Districts
($US billions)
Heavy Damage)

Country,	
  Date	
  of Incident

Types of Hazard

Causalities
(Deaths,
Missing)

Major Cause of
Deaths

Japan, March	
  11, 2011

Earthquake -‐
Tsunami &
Nuclear Accident

19.294

Tsunami, 95%

Chile,	
  February,	
  27,	
  2010

Earthquake -‐
Tsunami

541

Building	
  Collapse,	
  
66%

New Zealand,	
  February	
  22, 2011*

Earthquake,	
  Land
deformation*

185

100,00
Building	
  Collapse,	
  	
   damaged, 60%
3 cities,	
  1 district
78%
CBD businesses
displaced

359.000

38 cities,	
  3
prefectures

235

52 cities,	
  4
regions	
  **

30

190.358

Nuclear	
  accident,	
  
most death and
damage due to
tsunami

Extensive	
  coastal	
  
damage from
tsunami, interior
damaged from
earthquake

Most damage due
to soils failure,	
  
10,00
aftershocks

15

* Multiple quakes over nine months, with the Feb. 22, 2011, 6.3 event causing loss of life.
Sources: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/6394084/February-earthquake-toll-hits-185
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/christchurch-earthquake-among-the-worlds-most-costly

Table 2: Administrative and plans comparison.
Country

Main Entity	
  in
Charge of Recovery
and	
  Reconstruction

Japan

Recovery Agency
Central	
  
Government

Chile
New Zealand

Headquarters of
Main Entity

Estimated Years for Assistance	
  for Local
Recovery
Recovery	
  Plans

Damaged Cities and	
  
Country	
  Population
Larger Districts
(millions)
Impacted

Local governmen
Tokyo,	
  country	
   10 (first five years	
  
3 cities, 3 main
volunteer	
  
capital (with	
  3
concentrated	
  
prefectures,	
  5
professionals,	
  and
regional offices)
effort)
other	
  prefectures
hired consultants

Ministry of
Santiago, country	
  
Housing,	
  Central	
  
capital
Government
Recovery Agency
Christ	
  Church,	
  
Central	
  
Canterbury
Government
District

10
10

Consultants with
local government
Recovery	
  Entity
NGOs,	
  

** An additional 900 rural villages and communitites suffered damages.

52 cities,	
  4
regions	
  **

3 cities,	
  1 district

128
18
4,5

Table 3: Timetable of major actions and events over two-year period.
Country,	
  Date	
  o Incident

0-‐month 6

Japan, March	
  2, 2011

Recovery	
  plan adopted by 60% of
local/prefect.	
   gov’ts,
Central	
  Govt	
  Guidelines issued
All major infrastructure repaired

Chile,	
  February 2,	
  2010

New Zealand,	
  February	
  22, 2011

55,000 temporary shelter units built.
National recovery plan	
  issued

National Recovery Council in place
All major infrastructure repaired

Canterbury	
  Recovery Agency (CERA)	
  
created

Month 6-‐12

Month 13-‐18

Central	
  Govt Recovery Agency started

Specific projects	
  started	
  in cities

First project funds	
  issued	
  
Special Economic Zones	
  funding began

Community	
  development plans completed
Renewable energy	
  farm work begun
Rezoning Plan for Fukushima evacuation
Nuclear restricted zone 20 km line in place
areas announced
90% of work loss replaced
128,000 subsidies awarded.	
  -‐53 Local
Master Reconstruction	
  Plans and Strategic
Reconstruction Plans completed
Initial expropriate	
  actions taken to create	
  
tsunami barrier areas

Christ	
  Church	
  City	
  Council	
  complete
Central	
  City Plan	
  draft.
Draft Recovery	
  Strategy	
  

Government to acquire 7,000 properties

Regional infrastructure plan complete
Central	
  City	
  Plan draft taken over by CERA
Planning	
  unit.

Month 19-‐24

Complete	
  award of 220,000 subsidies
Start	
  155,000 units

Completed	
  86,000 units

Direct central gov’t projects in small towns
Replacement of major disaster designe
sewer	
  and	
  water	
  lines	
  begun	
  (This is a
public private	
  partnership.)	
  
Recovery	
  Strategy	
  Finalized
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two-year maximum stay was originally estimated, some areas
will need to extend this up to five years due to difficulties in
providing buildable sites.
All of the fishing ports along the impacted coastline of Iwate,
Myagi, and Fukushima prefectures suffered damages ranging
from loss of boats, ropes for seaweed cultivation, to destruc
tion of fish processing factories. After one year, new equip
ment has been obtained and over 50% of the fishing fleet has
returned to the sea. Due in part to a special government work
support program all survivors and evacuees can get employ
ment. There is actually a shortage of labor in the Tohoku re
gion due to all the recover work under way.
New Zealand faces a dual challenge. The Canterbury district,
located on the eastern coast of the South Island, experienced a
series of earthquakes of large size and thousands of aftershocks
over a nine-month period. The accumulation of quakes kept
damaging more buildings and caused extensive soil deforma
tion (liquefaction and lateral spread) over large areas of Christ
Church’s central city and its eastern suburbs. This resulted in
the demolition of half of all the buildings in the central busi
ness district of Christchurch (the nation’s second largest city of
380,000), and its landmark building, the Christchurch Anglican
Cathedral, still scheduled to be torn down. Three thousand
of the central business districts 5,000 businesses have been
closed. The soil deformation is so extensive in eastern resi
dential areas that over 7,000 houses have been declared nonrepairable and will be purchased by the central government.
All the homeowners will need to find houses in other areas of
the district. This will create a resettlement to areas away from
the central city as new housing is built on available green-field
sites identified in the Environment Canterbury district growth
plan. The central city needs to be rebuilt as an attractive place
for commerce, business, tourism, the arts and entertainment.
Such an effort means that urban design needs to play a role in
economic development as well as “public realm” creation.
Chile faces the challenge of reconstruction of many cities
along its coast and also in the interior. For coastal cities, safety
from tsunami is the key land planning issue as well as prevent
ing building where there is soil deformation in parts of the
major cities of Concepción and Talcahuano. In the interior of
the country the challenges are replacement of the thousands
of adobe buildings and finding enough land that can be eas
ily supplied with infrastructure services. The third challenge is
restoration of the many historic buildings (mostly churches).
The desire to restore many historic buildings made of adobe or
unreinforced masonry has spawned new research in structur
ally sound bricks and possibly the use of new plastic sheeting
with similar structural characteristics. Until such research can
be completed, hundreds of historic buildings remain closed
for public use, and will be subject to further deterioration and
damage from future earthquakes.
Chile faces a challenge in rebuilding 190,000 destroyed and
damaged houses, resettling the survivors living in temporary

Figure 3: Talcahuano, BioBío province, Chile. Green areas are
tsunami protection zones. (source: Plan Región del Bío-Bío
2010–2014, Santiago.

villages (known as Aldeas), and replacing 30,000 units of so
cial housing that do not meet current building codes and are
structurally vulnerable. Overall, when built to modern codes,
mid-rise buildings have performed well, with a few notable ex
ceptions including two buildings in Concepción, Chile.

Land use, a common thread
Land use is a central issue in all of these recovery cases, but for
different reasons. In Japan the issue expresses itself through
location of safe residential areas from tsunamis, because these
waves caused the greatest loss of life and mass evacuations.
Evacuation safety can be achieved in different ways: moving
far away from the risk (avoidance), building sea wall defenses,
or providing evacuation strategies for buildings sited in precar
ious places (e.g. develop strong buildings with protected stairs
to reach floors higher than the oncoming waves) (Figure 2).
Figure 4: East Hill Area of Greater Christchurch, landslide and land
deformation damage. Note the use of shipping containers as
temporary retaining wall. (photo by the author)
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planning occurs. It includes issues of what to do (as the assess
ment of damages is hopefully complete), how to do it, who
pays, what standards need to be applied, what are the prin
ciples of recovery, and who benefits from the process.
The question of who does the planning is tied to some funda
mental relationship between the central government and the
local community (the survivors and their local governments). In
multi-locational events that include many cities and towns this
can be a complex discussion. What one town wants may be not
what another wants or needs, especially if there are lots of towns
involved. Who decides where the resources will be allocated?
The comparative data in Table 2 speaks to this point in terms of
the very large number of impacted cities in Chile and Japan.
Figure 5. Framework of land use safety schemes. (author’s
translation of Recovery Plan, Prefecture of Iwate, Japan)

In many Chilean coastal communities the issues of tsunami pro
tection and of liquefaction are present. Again communities are
faced with choices. The central government, however, has cho
sen to implement expansion of sea barrier open parks through
expropriation of houses close to the ocean in at least the follow
ing towns: Dichacto, Constitución and Talcahuana (Figure 3). In
each case, the people losing their homes were against this, but
were compensated at full value of their house and land. Con
ducting the expropriation does take time and was required be
fore housing was rebuilt in nearby areas with less tsunami risk.
The Canterbury region of New Zealand faces a series of land
use issues, the largest being land damage from the earthquake
causes liquefaction, vertical land level changes (e.g. streets
higher than the driveways into adjacent houses) and lateral
spreading under thousands of houses. Within one year, 100,000
properties were surveyed for land damage. A cordon placed
around the central business district forced many businesses
to close, even if the buildings they occupied suffered less than
terminal damage (Figure 4). Private companies working for the
central government recovery agency determined the extent of
liquefaction and damage to a property. More than half of the
2,400 buildings in the central city area were severely damaged.
In the end it was the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency
that decided land use suitability and zoning. The local munici
pality had a secondary role in this process.
In Japan, while the earthquake caused damage to pre-1981
built houses, overall it was minor. The major damage was
caused by the tsunami. Thus all town and prefecture recovery
plans address the need for more safety. The three main strate
gies for this are shown in Figure 5: Avoid Risk, Separate Risk
and Control Risk. This is the central premise of all built environ
ment recovery and community development plans.

Dialogue
This is the phase where a discussion of who does the recovery

Chile
Chile and Japan used community plans as a stepping stone for
initial dialogue. The Chilean government provided funds and
consulting support for two regional efforts to create munici
pal recovery plans. One effort was in the Bío Bío Region, where
the regional governor facilitated the design of 18 master plans
for cities. Concepción, the region’s largest city conducted
their own separate process. These plans, developed under the
guidance of regional staff and consultants, worked with the
local people to create a vision for reconstruction and identi
fied the most important projects and areas that needed to be
addressed. The plans however are not legal or binding docu
ments. They are advisory to the local government, but could be
adopted and integrated into the legal master plan. These plans
also form the basis for a further level of discussion on specific
areas and projects. These plans can also introduce hazard and
inundation maps.
The second Chilean plan effort provided funding for 27 recov
ery plans to cities in the O’Higgins and Maule regions conduct
ed with the assistance of a team from the Pontificia Universi
dad Catolia de Chile (PUC). Coastal plans and inland plans were
developed along with extensive analysis of the geotecnical
status of the communities. These plans, like those in Bío Bío are
advisory to the local towns. All of these plans had a citizen par
ticipation component and various levels of consult support. In
at least three coastal towns the plans called for risk avoidance
through expropriate of areas close to the ocean.
Additional strategic recontruction plans were made for larger
interior cities such as Talca and Curició. The Talca strategic
plan was made with donated private funds, the assistance of
a private consultant, under an agreement with the city gov
ernment, the regional governor, and the housing ministry. The
Curició plan was also conducted by a private consultant with
donated funds, as well as from a local government and region
al governor agreement. All of these plans have a public par
ticipant component, but none give local community (neighor
hood) groups shared governance in the plan making process.
The community input is consultative.
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Japan
In Japan, all cities in the impacted Miyagi and Iwate impacted
prefectures, along with the prefectures, developed their own
plans within six months of the 2011 tsunami. These plans were
made with a mixture of volunteer professionals, consultants
and local residents. There was no central government oversight
in the plan making process, and the central government pro
vided funds for consultant support in each municipality. Volun
teer professionals from outside the community have played im
portant roles in helping local neighborhoods sort out complex
technical issues related to seawall heights, elevation of land for
relocation areas, and population projects related to the need
for public buildings such as schools. The continued level of vol
unteer support in Japan is impressive and useful, especially as
many survivors are living in scattered temporary shelters.
The central government’s Basic Guidelines for Recovery, issued
four months after the tsunami, calls for a model that places the
project planning at the municipal level and the project funding
at the ministerial level. The plan sets down the town’s principles
and vision. Overall, they call for the following: ensuring safety,
rebuilding lives, and expansion of technology and natural re
source based industry. The basic land use proposals generally
are built around a chosen risk avoidance strategy. The plans
function as the basis for developing specific recovery projects.
There are many small bays along the varying topography of
what is called the Sanriku Coast. In each bay there is usually
at least one village, and some municipalities are composed of
many bays. There is a real planning challenge, as shown in Fig
ure 6, where four towns were merged in 2005 to create Minani
sanrikucho. Plans are needed for these smaller areas, each with
its own culture, economic base and land use and hazard profile.
New Zealand
The New Zealand dialogue takes a different form. The central
government created the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Agency (CERA) with extensive powers to conduct the recovery
planning for the district (that contains three cities and a district
authority). The authority is located and operates from Christchurch. Christchurch, the main city in the region, was tasked
with developing only a Center Business District (CBD) Recovery
Plan. The recovery strategy is developed by CERA itself, along
with directing a special infrastructure reconstruction group
known as Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team
(SCIRT ), a multi-jurisdictional public-private group for major
infrastructure recovery, including a new wastewater plant,
which incorporates hazard mitigation design.
The city of Christchurch ran an extensive plan-making process
for the central city, with the assistance of an urban design con
sultant from Europe, and completed a series of community
workshops and input sessions that yielded 104,000 sugges
tions from people in the region. This plan was not adopted
by the Christchurch City Council, but was sent to the central

Figure 6. Minamisanrikucko, Myagi Prefecture, Japan.
(source: Ishikawa 2012a)

government earthquake minister for review. The Minister has
responded by calling for a special planning unit to be estab
lished to propose a set of feasible projects in the CBD. The city’s
CBD plan has not moved forward.

Action
Hopefully in this phase the decisions made in the other phases
of the framework lead to the allocation of resources (human,
governance, fiscal and physical) and action. In these countries
there exists a tension between central government ministries
and local government related to how, where and when recov
ery occurs. This can lead to friction, as a local urban design proj
ect will wait for funding until a larger regional transportation
improvement effort is completed. All of the countries present
ed have made progress towards recovery, but in different ways.
Figure 7: Proposed Reconstruction Zoning in Shizagawa Dis
trict, Minamisanrickuho Municipality, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan.
(source: Ishikawa, 2012b)
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Chile
Chile has been engaged in recovery for two full years. Among
the actions taken are: rapid establishment of recovery funding,
a housing subsidy program, local planning efforts, assistance to
the fishing areas, and a separate effort for reconstruction of his
toric buildings. The central government approved a multi-billion
dollars recovery budget. The division of labor to selected minis
tries was quickly assigned and a plan for reconstruction issued
six months from the time of the disaster. The model used by the
central government for housing reconstruction involves subsi
dies to low and modest income people who lost homes, with
the construction being done by the private sector. The private
sector is to obtain building permission from the local govern
ment. Local government is charged with being the gatekeeper
for where to build, and also is the entity responsive for determin
ing if the site is safe and can obtain needed infrastructure ser
vices (water, power, etc.). The private utility providers completed
major infrastructure recovery within three to twelve months.
At the end of the first year, 128,000 subsidies had been given,
and by the end of the second year, all 220,000 were awarded
(see Table 3). Transforming the subsidies into actual houses
rested with the basic choice of using a market driven model
and a local government gatekeeper model. Some cities have
been only able to give permits for twenty houses. Due to the
lag in performance, two years after the event, national legis
lation was passed allowing the regional office of the Housing
Ministry to provide direct assistance to some cities in order to
increase housing production. This assistance will be done with
the cooperation of local government, but the technical issues,
including issuing needed permits, will be managed by the re
gional office (Regional Secretariat for Housing and Planning).
This action decreases the level of decentralized (local) control
over the process, but will get more housing built.
Criticism of the Chilean experience includes lack of community
input, poor design solutions for replacement housing in such
towns as Talca, and expropriation of lands adjacent to the Pacific
Ocean instead of a sea wall of sea barrier solution. Overall the
recovery has tested the capacity of local government to respond
more than the capacity of central government to lead. Criticism

Figure 8: Christ Church Central
City; proposed “Frame Plan”.
(source: Christchurch Central
Recovery Plan; CERA website)
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over vernacular design solutions may not be well founded as
each local government has final approval of projects.
Japan
During the sixteen months since the 2011 tsunami, Japan has
been faced with stabilizing a nuclear accident, building 55,000
units of temporary houses, making new estimates of its earth
quake predication and tsunami models, creating a central gov
ernment reconstruction agency, and committing multi-billions
of dollars in recovery assistance. Within nine months, 90% of
the work lost had been replaced (through a combination of
getting employers back in business, new business and recov
ery job creation schemes). The reconstruction agency is called
the “one-stop shop,” however, it is the separate ministries that
draw up the guidelines for project applications and control re
sources. ( This includes the most powerful agency, the Minis
try of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.) While it is a
bottoms up process from the local level, the issuing of project
funds is a top down process. This process worked well enough
to issue 2.5 trillion yen in combined support less than one year
after the event, with 44% of the funds being housing related.
Uncertainty is the operative word about the long-term outcome
of the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear plant clean up and remedia
tion of surrounding lands. The nuclear plants remain unstable
and present a difficult decommissioning task. This is being ad
dressed by a separate new nuclear commission under the Min
istry of the Environment, and is outside the purview of the Re
construction Agency. In sixteen months, a plan for rezoning the
towns that fall under the evacuation zone has been developed,
and a program to purchase properties within the restricted zone
as well as compensation for loss of livelihood has been estab
lished. Japan’s Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (1961),
in its infancy, places no cap on the operator’s nuclear liability.
New Zealand
The New Zealand situation reflects various levels of complex
ity. After twenty months, technical analysis of the areas in the
Canterbury region with soil damage have been completed and
all neighborhoods know if they can rebuild or not. While the
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government has acquired almost half of the “7,000 red zone”
properties, the other half are still being processed. This is a dif
ficult and time-consuming process because some people do
not wish to sell out to the government even though remaining
there means having no infrastructure services provided. The
final agreements between the Earthquake Commission (the
Crown insurance entity) and the reinsurers are still to be made.
SCIRT is doing well in forging new levels of partnership gov
ernance for DDR infrastructure in the region. This means the
engineering focus is now on mitigation of risk, not on cost con
tainment. This is a significant step forward in holistic recovery.
The final CERA Recovery Strategy document and a central city
development plan was announced in August 2012. This plan
is the result of New Zealand consultant consortium of design
and project management professionals, and will focus on a
defined central city area. It is here that urban design should
make its best contribution. This plan will replace the one drawn
up and adopted created by the Christ Church City Council in
December 2011. This plan reflects the power of CERA as an ex
tension of the central government and also a rejection of the
previous plan making process.
The New Zealand insurance scheme is unique in the world and
complicates this recover. Over 90% of the country’s population
holds seismic insurance coverage for the house, the contents
and the land under the house. This large coverage is possible
as the seismic insurance is a required add-on to fire insurance,
which most people buy. There are two payers of the coverage in
case of a claim: a government agency known as the Earthquake
Commission (EQC) and private insurers (local companies and
re-insurance companies). The EQC is liable for the first $100,000
of property damage (including land damage) and $20,000 in
personal property. Claims above this amount are to be paid by
the private insurer. Because there were so many earthquakes
in the area, some 459,000 claims have been filled to date and a
total of $AU 3.77 billion have been paid as of October 1, 2011.
This is almost twice the total residential housing stock (220,000)
of the Canterbury area. The high number of claims is due to
multiple earthquakes. New Zealand is unique in the world in
this type of seismic coverage, where the vast majority of people
participate. For the most part this makes it far easier to address
the permanent housing replacement needs. The challenge for
planning is where to locate the permanent housing.
The Recovery Strategy focuses on identifying work to be pro
grammed. This work is linked to a set of nine CERA priorities,
the top five being: safety and well being, investment condi
tions, infrastructure repair, supply of land for recovery needs,
and coordinated work across central governments, local au
thorities, insurers, and the private sector.

Discussion
All of these countries have made people’s safety the first pri
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ority. Each is using land use controls, new building codes and
improved standards for location of shelter, commerce and civic
structures in creating the new urban form for the multitude of
cities that need assistance.
Due to the nuclear accident, Japan faces the most complicated
recovery task, but it has the most contemporary experience
with recovery and a national consensus to rebuild livelihoods
as well as the built environment. In many ways Chile has recov
ered quickly, and has provided its cities and towns with new
technical information on which to make future land use deci
sions. After eighteen months of deciding where not to build,
and a commitment to mitigation of its infrastructure risk, Christ
Church is ready to rebuild. It still faces challenges of paying to
rebuild confidence that it is a safe place. Each has used a differ
ent government-civic-private sector model, in part based on
its fiscal capacity and its legal and cultural views of recovery.
All, in a real sense, look towards the market (the private sector)
for positive long-term recovery. All, in some way, have also real
ized that all levels of government have a special responsibility to
protect its people. Hopefully they will take this lesson to heart
and prioritize safety for the homes and well-being of people.
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